X needs evidence that refusal to deal was truly concerted and notice campaign was not aggressive enforcement but systematically abusive and strategically targeted to suppress licensing competition.

X v. NMPA: When “Notice-and-Takedown” Starts Looking Like Market Power

by ChatGPT-5.2

X’s new Texas antitrust suit against the National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA) and a long list of music publishers is built around a provocative idea: that a practice that is normal and lawful in the abstract—sending DMCA takedown notices—can become unlawful when coordinated at scale to force industrywide licensing.

The complaint frames the dispute as a licensing standoff dressed up as copyright enforcement. According to X, publishers—“coordinated through NMPA”—refused to negotiate individual licenses and instead pursued a collective strategy aimed at making X accept “industry as a whole” deals at supracompetitive rates.

The “stick,” X alleges, was an announced “massive program” of DMCA notices that would convert popular users into “repeat infringers,” pressuring X to deplatform them and thereby degrade the platform’s value and ad revenue.

Publishers, meanwhile, have the simplest rebuttal story in the world: (1) we own rights; (2) X is allegedly the only major social platform that didn’t license songs; (3) DMCA notices are the statutory mechanism; (4) this is enforcement, not coercion. That’s essentially what NMPA’s CEO says publicly in the reporting: “X/Twitter is the only major social media company that does not license the songs on its platform,” and X’s suit is characterized as a “meritless” distraction from “legitimate” enforcement.

So the case turns on whether X can persuade a court that this is not just routine notice-sending, but (a) concerted refusal to deal plus (b) strategic, knowingly overbroad/baseless takedowns used as leverage to suppress competition in licensing.

The “Normalized DMCA” Problem: Lawful Tool, Potentially Unlawful Use

DMCA notices are, in many sectors, routine and high-volume. The statute is designed to let rightsholders notify platforms of claimed infringement and to give platforms safe-harbor incentives to remove or disable access expeditiously—without imposing an affirmative monitoring duty.

X leans hard into that architecture, arguing it has a “robust” DMCA process and repeat-infringer policy, and therefore can lawfully rely on safe harbor rather than licensing “all” works. This matters because if DMCA is a normal, lawful mechanism, then merely sending a lot of notices should not automatically imply anticompetitive conduct.

X tries to solve that by alleging qualitative wrongdoing, not just volume:

• Pretext / leverage: the notices are described as a “blunderbuss” campaign “designed to injure X…not to vindicate” copyrights.

• Baselessness: X claims notices targeted posts “not subject to any legitimate claim of infringement.”

• Coordination to prevent “defection”: the scheme allegedly worked because any publisher whose works disappeared from the weekly takedown lists would be suspected of negotiating separately—so nobody defects.

• Departure from past practice: before Dec 2021, X says it received sporadic, publisher-by-publisher notices; the NMPA “all music publishers” approach was a step-change.

In other words, X is asking the court to see DMCA notices the way antitrust sometimes sees other “normal” business conduct: fine individually; suspicious when coordinated among competitors to achieve market-wide pricing/terms.

The Most Surprising, Controversial, and Valuable Statements/Findings

1) The alleged “largest DMCA effort in history” threat

X quotes an October 2021 email from NMPA’s CEO threatening notices “on a scale larger than any previous effort in DMCA history,” explicitly predicting popular users would become “repeat infringers” and have to be deplatformed.
Why it matters: it reads less like ordinary enforcement and more like planned platform pain as bargaining leverage.

2) The scale claims are extraordinary

X alleges over 200,000 posts were identified in the first year, and that notices came “virtually every single week,” plus more than 50,000 user suspensions tied to infringement claims.
Why it matters: even if high-volume notice sending is “normalized,” these numbers support a narrative of industrialized enforcement that could be argued to have effects beyond removal of specific infringing items.

3) The “over 90% of the market” framing

X alleges publishers account for over 90% of the market for licenses to copyrighted musical compositions, and that this collective power was wielded through NMPA.
Why it matters: that’s the backbone of the Section 2 theories (monopolization / attempt / conspiracy), and it’s also the rhetorical glue for “supracompetitive rates.”

4) The complaint openly says the goal is not to license everything

X asserts it “does not need to license works from all Music Publishers” and would only license where a “critical mass” benefit outweighs the cost.

Why it matters:it positions X as rationally choosing selective licensing—but it also hands defendants a talking point: “they want to free-ride on music discussion while avoiding licensing norms.”

5) The “paltry IT budget” argument

X claims it’s economically irrational for giant publishers to rely on NMPA to run this unless the objective is coordination, pointing to Warner Chappell revenue and NMPA’s “$68,000” IT budget.

Why it matters: this is a clever “follow the economics” allegation meant to reframe the trade association’s role as a coordination hub rather than an efficiency play.

6) The Warner Chappell “join the takedowns” pressure point

X describes communications suggesting Warner Chappell withheld participation in takedowns while expecting X to engage on licensing—and implying it would join the takedown activity if not.
Why it matters: this is one of X’s best “agreement/concerted action” narrative hooks, at least at the pleading stage.

7) The case happens against a backdrop where X already faced (and partly survived) an infringement suit

X acknowledges the publishers’ Tennessee infringement case: most claims were dismissed, but a contributory infringement theory survived on narrow grounds (including alleged delay on takedowns and handling of serial infringers).

Why it matters: that undercuts the “we’re fully compliant, notices are baseless” posture and gives defendants credibility: some enforcement concerns were plausibly pleaded before.

Assessing X’s Chances (Realistically)

My, ChatGPT’s, best read: X’s odds are materially better at getting into discovery than at winning the merits, and the “DMCA weaponization” theme is more useful as leverage for settlement than as a clean path to a final judgment.

Where X is strongest

1. Section 1 (agreement / concerted refusal to deal) plausibility.
   The complaint is designed to plead coordination: collective threats, weekly centralized notices “on behalf of all,” and an alleged industry pattern with other platforms (Twitch/Roblox/etc.).
   That can be enough to survive early motions if the court accepts that what’s alleged is not mere parallel conduct but coordinated strategy.

2. The “effects on users” story is tangible.
   X claims user suspensions, removals including incidental/fair uses, and harm to platform communities.
   Even if not decisive for antitrust, it’s persuasive equity for injunctive framing.

Where X is weakest

1. “Per se” is likely overreach.
   X explicitly pleads the refusal to deal as a per se Section 1 violation.

   x-corp-v-nmpa

   Courts are cautious about per se treatment in complex IP/licensing contexts; defendants will argue there are plausible efficiencies (transaction costs, standard licensing frameworks, avoiding fragmented rights) and that rule of reason should apply.

2. Section 2 theories face the “right to exclude / no duty to deal” headwinds.
   Even if publishers collectively have huge market share, antitrust law is generally reluctant to force IP owners to license or to deal on particular terms absent exceptional circumstances. X is asking, functionally, for the court to police how rightsholders coordinate pricing/terms—but courts are often wary of converting antitrust into a compulsory licensing regime.

3. DMCA notices are statutorily contemplated conduct.
   To make DMCA sending “anticompetitive,” X must convince the court the notices were knowingly baseless or otherwise abusive at a systemic level—because otherwise defendants can say: “we used the mechanism Congress designed.”

4. Credibility risk from the parallel infringement dispute.
   Publishers will point to the still-pending Tennessee matter and argue: “these notices weren’t pretext; the platform had real infringement problems.”

Net:

• Chance X survives a motion to dismiss: plausible (especially on Section 1).

• Chance X wins broad merits and gets major antitrust relief: meaningfully lower.

• Chance this ends in settlement + some licensing framework changes: high (the reporting already notes “substantial progress toward settlement” in late 2025 before talks broke down).

Plausible Case Outcomes

1. Early narrowing / partial dismissal

   • Court rejects the per se framing; keeps only rule-of-reason Section 1 (and maybe some Texas claims).

   • Section 2 monopolization/attempt claims trimmed if the court finds the alleged “market” or “exclusionary conduct” theory too thin.

2. Discovery-driven settlement

   • X seeks internal comms about collective strategy (“expand the pie” rhetoric, enforcement targeting choices, negotiation coordination).

     x-corp-v-nmpa

   • Publishers seek discovery on X’s infringement controls, response times, repeat-infringer enforcement, and monetization.

   • Settlement lands as: licensing deal(s), possibly a structured process for notices, maybe an “opt-in” collective mechanism with guardrails.

3. Injunction-lite outcome

   • Even if money damages are hard, a court could be more receptive to behavioral constraints—e.g., limiting trade-association coordination on licensing negotiations or requiring clearer separation between enforcement operations and collective rate-setting discussions—without compelling any publisher to license.

4. Publishers win cleanly

   • Court characterizes the conduct as routine enforcement plus lawful parallel refusal to license, and dismisses antitrust claims; the parties revert to fighting (or settling) the infringement case(s).

What the “Ideal” Legally Compliant Outcome Should Be (Given the Statutes and the Competing Policy Goals)

If you take the DMCA’s structure seriously, and also take antitrust’s purpose seriously, the “best” outcome is not“publishers can’t send notices” and not “X gets to host mass music uses without licensing.” It’s a compliance equilibrium:

1) Preserve DMCA enforcement—but police abusive or knowingly overbroad notice practices

The DMCA is intended to enable notice-and-takedown and safe harbor.

So the legally compliant ideal is:

• Rightsholders (and their agents) send notices grounded in good-faith infringement claims.

• Platforms expeditiously act, provide counter-notice paths, and maintain a real repeat-infringer policy.

• If X can prove systematic “baseless” notices used strategically, the remedy should target that abusiveness—not the existence of notice sending.

2) Keep licensing voluntary—but restrict competitor coordination that suppresses competitive licensing alternatives

Antitrust shouldn’t become a court-imposed compulsory licensing regime. Yet it also shouldn’t allow competitors to use a trade association to eliminate price/term competition while presenting it as “industry partnership.” X alleges precisely that elimination of competition (“deny X the benefit of competition between music publishers”).

The ideal outcome would:

• Allow publishers to choose whether to license;

• Prevent agreements whose practical effect is “no one may deal unless all deal,” ifthat is proven as a coordinated restraint.

3) A compliant “middle architecture”: opt-in collective licensing with antitrust guardrails

If the real-world problem is transaction costs and fragmentation, the compliant fix is not coercion but transparent, opt-in structures that reduce friction without eliminating competition:

• publishers can opt in/out;

• standardized terms can exist, but individual negotiation remains available;

• governance separates enforcement operations from licensing-rate coordination.

That kind of structure addresses the complaint’s core allegation—collective coercion—while respecting the DMCA’s purpose and the basic right of copyright owners to enforce.

Bottom Line View

X’s filing is rhetorically powerful because it reframes DMCA volume as market conduct and describes a “playbook” across platforms.

But the law will likely demand more than a big-number narrative:X will need evidence that (1) the refusal to deal was truly concerted and (2) the notice campaign was not merely aggressive enforcement but systematically abusive/baseless and strategically targeted to suppress licensing competition.

If X can’t show that, the “normalized practice” of DMCA sending becomes the defendants’ shield: Congress designed the mechanism; they used it; and antitrust shouldn’t rewrite copyright enforcement into compulsory licensing. If X can show it, then the most legally coherent remedy is a narrow one: restrain coercive coordination and abusive notice practices—without disabling legitimate enforcement or forcing anyone to license.