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- The report positions AI governance as a long-term constitutional and societal project, not a short-term competitiveness agenda.
The report positions AI governance as a long-term constitutional and societal project, not a short-term competitiveness agenda.
The Irish Committee’s approach offers a strong template for democratic AI governance, particularly for jurisdictions that share EU legal foundations or rights-based constitutional traditions.
Governing AI as a Societal System, Not Just a Technology
by ChatGPT-5.2
The First Interim Report of the Joint Committee on Artificial Intelligence represents one of the most comprehensive parliamentary attempts in Europe to treat artificial intelligence not merely as an economic or technical phenomenon, but as a societal system with profound implications for rights, democracy, equality, energy, and public trust.
Rather than focusing narrowly on innovation policy or competitiveness, the report takes a deliberately human-centred and rights-based approach. It frames AI as a tool that can be shaped by policy choices, governance structures, and public values, rather than as an unstoppable force dictated by markets or technology vendors. This framing is consistent throughout the report and is reinforced by the sheer breadth of its 85 recommendations, which span regulation, education, public procurement, children’s rights, disability, environmental sustainability, and democratic participation.
A central institutional proposal is the creation of a National AI Office, intended to act as Ireland’s single point of contact under the EU AI Act and to coordinate AI governance across government. Crucially, the Committee emphasises that this office must be independent, well-resourced, and technically competent, explicitly warning against conflicts between industrial policy, public-sector AI deployment, and regulatory enforcement. This reflects an acute awareness of regulatory capture risks that have already materialised in other jurisdictions.
The report is also notable for rejecting the familiar “innovation versus regulation” narrative. Drawing parallels with the GDPR, witnesses argue that robust regulation can raise global standards rather than deter investment. In this view, the EU AI Act should be treated as a floor, not a ceiling, and Ireland should resist pressure from commercial interests to dilute its implementation. This stance places the Committee firmly in the camp of regulatory assertiveness rather than permissive experimentation.
Another defining feature of the report is its strong emphasis on vulnerable and structurally disadvantaged groups. Separate, detailed sections address children and young people, older people, and people with disabilities, each grounded in testimony from civil society organisations and rights advocates. AI systems are repeatedly described as “not neutral”, with particular concern about biased training data, recommender systems, and automated decision-making in public services. The report goes as far as recommending that biased or discriminatory AI deployments be treated as breaches of equality law, exposing operators to enforcement action and litigation.
Environmental sustainability is treated not as a side issue but as a systemic constraint on AI deployment. The Committee highlights the unsustainable energy trajectory of AI, especially in a country already struggling with data-centre capacity and grid limitations. The warning that AI could outstrip global electricity generation if current growth rates continue is not presented as speculative alarmism, but as a planning assumption that must shape infrastructure and climate policy.
Finally, the report places unusual emphasis on democratic participation. Proposals for a Citizens’ Assembly on AI, public AI literacy campaigns, and mechanisms for ongoing societal input reflect a belief that AI governance cannot be left solely to experts, regulators, or industry. Consent, transparency, and public understanding are treated as preconditions for legitimacy.
Taken together, the report positions AI governance as a long-term constitutional and societal project, not a short-term competitiveness agenda.
Most Surprising Findings
Recommender systems should be switched off by default, and banned entirely for children’s accounts. This goes significantly beyond current EU practice and challenges the core business model of major platforms.
The EU Copyright Directive should be strengthened to require creator consent for AI training, rejecting the assumption that existing text-and-data-mining exceptions are sufficient.
Biased AI systems should trigger equality law enforcement and litigation, not just technical remediation or voluntary fixes.
AI energy consumption could exceed total planetary electricity generation if current trends continue, elevating AI from a digital policy issue to a climate-level risk.
Publicly owned AI resources should be explored, signalling openness to state-backed or commons-based AI alternatives rather than total reliance on Big Tech.
Most Controversial Positions
Treating the EU AI Act as a minimum baseline, not a maximum standard, directly contradicts lobbying efforts by large AI developers.
Switch-off-by-default recommender systems, especially for adults, challenges deeply entrenched assumptions about user choice and platform design.
Locating AI bias squarely within existing equality and discrimination law, rather than treating it as a novel technical problem.
Insisting on strong independence for the National AI Office, despite plans to place it within an economically oriented government department.
Explicit scepticism of private-sector dominance, including warnings that “if you are not paying for the product, you are the product”.
Most Valuable Contributions
Systemic framing of AI risks, including national AI risk registers and cross-sector monitoring.
Deep integration of human rights frameworks (UNCRC, UNCRPD, equality law) into AI governance.
Concrete accountability mechanisms, such as public registers of algorithmic systems and mandatory reporting by public bodies.
Recognition that AI literacy must coexist with human skills, such as critical thinking and emotional intelligence.
Early and sustained inclusion of marginalised groups through co-design and participatory governance.
Should Other Countries and Regulators Follow Suit?
Yes — with adaptations.
The Irish Committee’s approach offers a strong template for democratic AI governance, particularly for jurisdictions that share EU legal foundations or rights-based constitutional traditions. Its insistence on institutional independence, public accountability, and human-rights grounding is both timely and transferable.
However, replication should not be superficial. Other countries would need:
Comparable equality and human-rights enforcement capacity.
Adequate funding for regulators and civil society participation.
Political willingness to confront platform power and lobbying pressure.
In this sense, the report is as much a test of political courage as it is a policy blueprint.
What Is Missing or Underdeveloped?
Despite its strengths, several gaps stand out:
Geopolitics and national security are largely absent. The report does not fully engage with AI’s role in geopolitical competition, defence, or strategic dependencies.
Foundation models and compute concentration receive surprisingly little attention, given their central role in current AI power structures.
Cross-border enforcement challenges are acknowledged but not deeply analysed, especially regarding non-EU AI providers.
Economic transition impacts, such as labour displacement and publisher/creator market collapse, are mentioned only indirectly.
Points of Agreement and Disagreement
Strong agreement:
AI is not neutral and must be governed through rights-based frameworks.
Regulation and innovation are not opposites.
Recommender systems represent a major, under-regulated source of harm.
Public consent and literacy are prerequisites for legitimate AI deployment.
Mild disagreement or caution:
Some recommendations risk over-reliance on process (registries, reporting) without equal emphasis on enforcement speed and sanctions.
Publicly owned AI is promising but under-specified; without clear scope, it risks becoming symbolic rather than operational.
Conclusion
This interim report is unusually candid, ambitious, and power-aware for a parliamentary document on AI. It refuses technological determinism, rejects regulatory minimalism, and centres those most likely to bear AI’s harms rather than its profits. While not exhaustive, it sets a high bar for democratic AI governance and challenges other countries to decide whether they are willing to treat AI not just as an engine of growth, but as a public-interest infrastructure that must earn its legitimacy.

