GPT-4o: The Amsterdam Riots of 7 and 8 November 2024—The Dutch government did not fail outright, but the absence of proactive national coordination on such a politically charged date...

The Amsterdam Riots of 7 and 8 November 2024 — An Analysis of What Happened, What Went Wrong, and What We Must Learn

by ChatGPT-4o

A. What Happened

On 7 and 8 November 2024, Amsterdam experienced serious public disturbances surrounding a Europa League football match between Ajax and Maccabi Tel Aviv. The event coincided with the annual Kristallnacht commemoration, and occurred amid heightened geopolitical tensions due to the war in Gaza and Lebanon. This volatile mix of football rivalry, political protest, and cultural commemoration led to violent confrontations between pro-Palestinian demonstrators and Maccabi supporters across the city.

The situation deteriorated particularly during the night of 7–8 November. Individuals perceived to be Jewish became targets of "blitz attacks" — rapid, mobile assaults carried out using scooters, taxis, or on foot. This violence included targeted harassment, threats, and physical assaults. The police were present in large numbers (over 1,200 officers), equipped with drones, riot squads, mounted units, and water cannons. Despite this, the violence outpaced the preparedness and adaptability of law enforcement. [Reports and summary]

B. What Went Wrong

1. Lack of Real-Time Operational Translation: Although governance structures (i.e. the "driehoek" and the SGBO) were formally sound and planning was extensive, the police struggled to translate pre-defined plans into rapid, effective responses during fast-changing street-level developments.

2. Inadequate Social Media Anticipation: The report highlights the catalytic role of social media in escalating tensions. While the police monitored platforms and had an OSINT team, the system failed to pre-emptively respond to inflammatory messages and quickly mobilizing groups. Preventive action was hampered by the challenge of distinguishing between incitement and actual threats.

3. Misunderstandings About NCTV’s Role: The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) acted in accordance with its defined duties but misalignment with local actors’ expectations caused confusion. Local authorities incorrectly expected NCTV to also assess public order threats, whereas NCTV’s mandate is limited to identifying terrorist threats.

4. Insufficient Flexibility for “Blitz” Tactics: Traditional crowd control tools proved inadequate in the face of fast, targeted, small-scale attacks ("flitsaanvallen") on Jewish-looking individuals across dispersed city zones. The decentralized and mobile nature of the attacks made it hard for centralized units to respond in time.

C. Surprising, Controversial, and Educational Aspects

Surprising:

• The report reveals that victims were targeted because they were perceived to be Jewish, regardless of their actual background — a chilling escalation that raises questions about hate crime preparedness in Dutch urban policing.

• Despite the scale of deployment, many violent incidents occurred without timely police intervention, especially in peripheral zones.

Controversial:

• The NCTV concluded there was no concrete threat in advance — a finding that may be technically accurate but politically and socially contentious, given the Kristallnacht context and the charged geopolitical atmosphere.

• The suggestion that “improvisational capability” suffices to replace strategic mobility planning indicates systemic weaknesses in riot response doctrines.

Educational:

• The event underlines the profound influence of digital platforms in real-time crowd behavior and escalation. It also demonstrates the limitations of current law enforcement tools in the age of decentralized, app-coordinated violence.

• It reveals a governance gap between national threat assessment bodies and local operational realities, necessitating clearer role definitions and communication pathways.

D. Evaluation of the Situation and Governmental Intervention

The report is thorough and well-structured, acknowledging the police’s flexibility, professionalism, and constraints. It avoids scapegoating while highlighting systemic and situational failures. However, the report is also notably cautious in criticizing higher-level decision-making. Its neutrality, though institutionally appropriate, risks underplaying the severity of state unpreparedness for anti-Semitic violence.

The Dutch government did not fail outright, but the absence of proactive national coordination on such a politically charged date — especially when involving Israeli interests, Jewish communities, and Middle Eastern tensions — points to a gap in anticipatory governance. The NCTV’s narrow interpretation of its role, though procedurally correct, indicates a need for broader coordination mandates in hybrid security threats that mix terrorism, hate crime, and civil unrest.

E. Could the Government Have Prevented This? What Should Be Done?

Preventability:
Yes, to a degree. Similar events — such as the anti-Semitic riots during the 2014 Gaza conflict in France or anti-lockdown riots in Germany — were defused more effectively by:

• Declaring high-risk events as “national security incidents” to unify command structures.

• Imposing dynamic protest-routing and conditional protest approvals based on real-time risk modelling.

• Pre-positioning mobile rapid response units and legal observers with clear arrest mandates for hate speech and intimidation.

Recommendations:

1. Enhanced Joint Threat Protocols: Create hybrid public-order threat frameworks that integrate terrorism, hate crime, and digital incitement, beyond NCTV’s current focus on terrorism alone.

2. Real-Time OSINT Units with Legal Mandates: Embed real-time digital monitoring teams with powers to trigger proactive deployment, with pre-agreed thresholds for intervention.

3. Cross-Government Crisis Simulations: Regular simulations involving the NCTV, police, municipalities, and Jewish/Muslim community liaisons to stress-test protocols in ethnically or religiously charged contexts.

4. Counter-Mobilization Readiness: Equip police with pre-authorized, mobile task forces trained specifically in managing dispersed, app-coordinated violence using “blitz” tactics.

5. Legal Reform for Hate-Driven Targeting: Amend criminal codes to elevate the legal gravity of identity-based “flash attacks” akin to hate crime enhancements in US or UK jurisdictions.

Conclusion

The Amsterdam disturbances of November 2024 are a stark reminder of how modern unrest is no longer confined to static protest zones or football hooliganism. They combine emotional geopolitics, digital incitement, and targeted hate into fast-moving urban flashpoints. The Dutch response, while professional, lacked anticipatory coherence and coordination. Going forward, national security actors must evolve beyond siloed mandates. The next crisis may come faster, more fragmented, and with more at stake — unless lessons from Amsterdam are acted upon with urgency.